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Introduction
Boom-bust cycles in asset prices and economic activity are a central issue in policy and academic debates. Particular attention has been given to the behavior of housing prices and housing investment. We document that, over the last three decades, housing prices boom-bust cycles in the United States have been characterized by co-movement in GDP, consumption, investment, hours worked, real wages and housing investment. Moreover, housing prices peaks are often followed by macroeconomic recessions. This paper suggests a mechanism for modeling housing-market boom-bust cycles in accordance with the empirical pattern. Modeling endogenous boom-bust cycles in macroeconomics is a major challenge. Our explanation builds on a "news shock" mechanism where public signals of future Our paper analyzes whether not only news about productivity but also news on other sources of macroeconomic fluctuations, such as housing demand and monetary policy, are able to generate expectations-driven cycles in the housing market. We show that a necessary condition for a boombust cycle is that agents expect a future increase in housing prices, which fuels current housing demand and lifts housing prices immediately. Thus, the increase in housing prices is coupled with an endogenous increase in household indebtedness. Accordingly, changes in expectations about future productivity, investment costs, housing supply, inflation, the policy rate and the central bank's target can generate housing-market boom-bust cycles characterized by co-movement in GDP, consumption, investment, hours and real wages.
This paper provides several insightful results. First, we show that in the presence of nominal price and wage rigidities, expectations on productivity generate business cycle fluctuations and boom-bust cycle dynamics in the housing market.
Second, expectations of future expansionary monetary policy that are not met, both regarding the policy rate and the central bank's inflation target, are likely to cause a boom-bust cycle and a macroeconomic recession. Thus, a high degree of transparency in monetary policy reduces uncertainty about future monetary policy actions and thereby the occurrence of cycles.
Third, we find that expectations of a future increase in housing demand fail to generate boombust cycles in the housing market. According to Iacoviello and Neri (2009) housing demand shocks explain one-quarter of fluctuations in housing prices and housing investment in the United States over the last four decades. However, we show that expectations of a future increase in housing demand lead to a housing price boom but fail to generate co-movement between business investment and all other aggregate variables.
Last, according to our findings, changes in households' expectations about future macroeconomic developments lead to an increase in both housing prices and household indebtedness. We also analyze the effects of current and anticipated exogenous changes in credit conditions. A current unanticipated increase in the access to credit raises on impact house prices and all other macroeconomic variables but fails to generate a hump-shaped dynamics. Expectations of future changes in the access to credit do not generate commovement between business investment and GDP. However, we document that an exogenous improvement in the access to credit generates boom-bust cycle dynamics in aggregate variables only if the current situation in the credit market is expected to be reversed in the near future.
It is important to stress that the goal of this paper is not to explain exactly what happened to a specific country, but to draw qualitative conclusions on the plausibility of changes in expectations as a mechanism to generate boom-bust cycles in the housing market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 characterizes the average behavior of several macroeconomic variables during four boom-bust episodes in the U.S. housing market in the last four decades. Section 4 describes the model. Sections 5 to 8 investigate the occurrence of boom-bust cycles as a consequence of expectations on future macroeconomic developments and Section 9 concludes.
Literature on Expectations-Driven Cycles
According to Beautry and Portier (2006) business cycle fluctuations in the data are primarily driven by changes in agents' expectations about future technological growth. In fact, they first document that stock prices movements anticipate future growth in total factor productivity and that such dynamics are accompanied by a macroeconomic boom. More recently, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) show that innovations in expectations to future neutral productivity shocks, permanent investment-specific shocks, and government spending shocks account for more than two thirds of predicted aggregate fluctuations in postwar United States. However, as already shown by Beautry and Portier (2004, 2007) , a standard one-sector optimal growth model is unable to generate boom-bust cycles in response to news. At the time of the signal consumption increases and hours worked fall thanks to the wealth effect generated by expectations of improved future macroeconomic conditions. Since technology has not improved yet, output decreases. In order for consumption to increase despite the reduction in hours worked, investment has to fall. Thus, good news creates a boom in private consumption and a decline in hours worked, investment and output. A two-sector model with consumption and capital goods is also unable to generate a boom in macroeconomic variables. 1 When a three-sector model is considered, Portier (2004, 2007) show that expectations-driven cycles can arise provided firms exhibit economy of scope or, in other words, internal cost complementarities between the production of different goods.
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008) introduce three elements in an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model: Variable capital utilization; adjustment costs to investment; and a weak short-run wealth elasticity of labor supply. This latter element is introduced by assuming a generalized version of the preference specification considered by Greenwood, Huffman, Hercowitz (1988) . A one-sector model displays co-movement of consumption, output, investment and hours worked in response to news about future total factor productivity or about investment-specific technology.
The value of the firm, however, falls unless the production function features decreasing returns to scale as stemming from a factor of production in fixed supply. A two sector model is able to generate co-movement in response to news about future aggregate productivity, productivity in the consumption sector, and productivity in the investment sector only provided the short-run wealth effects on the labor supply are very low, the elasticity of labor supply is high and the elasticity of capacity utilization is low. Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008) also explore a version of their two-sector model with adjustment costs to labor and find they are helpful to generate co-movement in response to news. 2 1 News about productivity in the capital sector raises consumption but reduces hours worked. As a result, investment, capital and output fall. An announcement of future higher productivity in the consumption sector generates a boom in all macro variables except consumption for elasticities of intertemporal substitution above one; vice versa, it generates a bust in all macro variables but consumption when the elasticity is below one. Figure 1 indicate the peak dates. 5 Our definition of peak is robust to de-trending, either with a linear trend or with an Hodrick-Prescott filter. 6 Interestingly, real house prices peaks are followed by macroeconomic recessions. The grey shaded areas in Figure 1 indicate recession dates according to the National Bureau of Economic Research. 7 Every housing peak as defined above has been followed by an economic downturn. Even the housing price high of 1969:4, which does not qualify as a peak according to our definition because real house prices rebound too quickly, is followed by a recession.
We are interested in characterizing the behavior of our macroeconomic variables during these 3 We rely on the same data used by Iacoviello and Neri (2009) would fail to be a peak. In general, upward trending house prices make it difficult to identify peaks in long, centered windows because prices do not fall all the way to the levels they had at the beginning of the boom. On the other hand, a shorter centered window of seventeen quarters would deliver an additional peak in 1969:4. four boom-bust episodes. First we consider the average behavior of these series over the four peak episodes. Figure 2 shows the average behavior of these variables in the twenty-one quarter window around a peak date. The vertical line indicates the peak in real house prices.
On average real house prices are pro-cyclical during boom-bust episodes. In fact, real house prices peak when real GDP reaches a maximum. Figures 4 to 7 illustrate the behavior of the macroeconomic variables of interest in each peak episode and we will discuss the differences among peak episodes later. Real personal consumption also increases during the boom in real house prices and peaks around the same time as the peak in real GDP and house prices.
Real private residential fixed investment reaches its maximum before the peak in house prices and falls rapidly afterward. On the other hand, real private nonresidential fixed investment raises during the boom period, peaks after the peak in housing prices and falls afterward. Hours worked follow closely the dynamics of real house prices, both in the construction and in the consumptiongood sector. Hours rise during the boom phase and fall during the bust one.
The interest rate is the three months Treasury bill interest rate. It increases throughout the boom period, peaks around the time of or just after the peak in house prices, and then it falls rapidly. The empirical evidence therefore lends support to the hypothesis that housing price booms are fueled by low interest rates.
Inflation follows with some lags real house prices and other macroeconomic variables. On average, inflation increases before the peak in house prices, reaches a maximum after the peak in house prices and then falls. Real wages are also pro-cyclical during boom-bust episodes. Real wages in the consumption-good sector rise in the boom and fall in the bust phase. Real wages in the construction sector have a similar pattern with a couple of differences: They peak before real house prices (and real wages in the consumption-good sector) and they fall much more rapidly after that.
Next we transform our variables in deviations from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and then calculate the average over the four housing-peak episodes. This allows us to see if housing boom-bust episodes are accompanied by below-or above-trend behavior of some variables. Figure 3 shows the data.
A number of observations are in order. Real house prices, real GDP, private consumption and investment, both residential and nonresidential, fall below trend at the end of the bust phase.
Models featuring unanticipated shocks that eventually die away cannot reproduce this feature of the data. The nominal interest rate is well below trend at the beginning of the boom phase, consistent with the evidence in Figure 2 . Real wages start at or above trend, peak before the peak in real house prices and then fall well below trend. Table 1 For completeness we report the main features of the model in the following.
Households
The economy is populated by two types of households: the Saver and the Borrower. They both work in the good-and housing-sector of production, consume and accumulate housing. They differ in their discount factors, (β and β ). Borrowers (denoted by ) feature a relatively lower subjective discount factor that in equilibrium generates an incentive to anticipate future consumption to the current period through borrowing. Hence, the ex-ante heterogeneity induces credit flows between the two types of agents. This modeling feature has been introduced in macro models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended by Iacoviello (2005) to a business cycle framework with housing investment.
The Saver maximizes the utility function with respect to :
subject to:
where c, h , n c and n h are consumption, housing services, hours worked in the good-sector and in the construction-sector, respectively. The parameter ξ defines the degree of substitution between the two sectors in terms of hours worked 8 . j t determines the relative weight in utility of housing services, R t is the lending interest rate, δ c and δ h represent the depreciation rate for capital and housing stock, respectively. l t is the land priced at p l,t and q t is the price of the houses, all relative to the CPI. z c,t and z h,t are the capital utilization rates of transforming potential capital into effective capital in the two sectors. D t are lump-sum profits paid to households. The term A k,t is an investment-specific technology that captures the marginal cost of producing consumption-goodsector specific capital. 9 G C , G IKc and G IK h are the trend growth rates of real consumption and capital used in the two sectors of production. Γ c and Γ c represent scaling factors of the marginal utilities of consumption. Wages are set in a monopolistic way and can be adjusted subject to a Calvo scheme with probability 1 − θ w every period. X wc,t and X wh,t are markups on the wages paid in the two sectors. Both households set wages in a monopolistic way.
The Borrower maximizes the utility function:
8 For a value of ξ close to zero, hours worked in the two sectors are close to perfect substitutes, which means that the worker would devote most of the time to the sector that pays the highest wage. Positive values of ξ imply, instead, that hours worked are far from perfect substitutes, thus the worker is less willing to diversify her working hours across sectors even in the presence of a wage differential (see Horvath (2000) for details).
(1+γ AK ) t is the good-sector capital adjustment cost, and
is the housing-sector capital adjustment cost; γAK represents the net growth rate of technology in business capital, φ kc and φ kh indicate the coefficients for adjustment cost (i.e., the relative prices of installing the existing capital) for capital used in the consumption sector and housing sector respectively.
Limits on borrowing are introduced through the assumption that households cannot borrow more than a fraction of the next-period value of the housing stock. The fraction m, referred to as the equity requirement or loan-to-value ratio, should not exceed one and is treated as exogenous to the model. It can be interpreted as the creditor's overall judicial costs in case of debtor default and represents the degree of credit frictions in the economy. The borrowing constraint is consistent with standard lending criteria used in the mortgage and consumer loan markets. We explore the effects of temporary deviations from the established degree of credit market access by assuming that m t is stochastic. We refer to this as a loan-to-value ratio shock.
Firms
Final good producing firms produce non-durable goods (Y) and new houses (IH). Both sectors face Cobb-Douglas production functions. The housing sector uses capital, k, land, l, and labor supplied by the Savers, n, and the Borrowers, n , as inputs of production.
The non-housing sector produces consumption and business capital using labor and capital.
A h,t and A c,t are the productivity shocks to the housing-and good-sector, respectively. Firms pay the wages to households and repay back the rented capital to the Savers.
The intermediate good-sector is populated by a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms owned by the Savers. Prices can be adjusted by each producer with probability 1 − θ π every period, following a Calvo-setting. Monopolistic competition occurs at the retail level, leading to the following forward-looking Philips curve:
where π =
(1−θπ)(1−βθπ) θπ , X t represents the price markup and u p,t is a cost-push shock. In contrast, housing prices are assumed to be flexible.
Monetary Policy Rule
We assume that the central bank follows a Taylor-type rule as estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2009):
where rr is the steady-state real interest rate and u R,t is a monetary policy shock. The central bank's target is assumed to be time varying and subject to a persistent shock, s t , as in Smets and 
where q is real housing prices along the balanced growth path.
News Shocks
Productivity (A c ), investment-specific (A k ), housing supply (A h ), inflation target (A s ), housing demand (j) and loan-to-value ratio (m) shocks are assumed to follow an AR(1) process
where z = {c, k, h, s, j, m}. 10 The cost-push shock (u p,t ) and the shock to the policy rule (u R,t ) are assumed to be i.i.d. To introduce expectations of future macroeconomic developments we assume that the error term of the shock consists of an unanticipated component, ε z,t , and an anticipated change n quarters in advance, ε z,t−n ,
where ε z,t is i.i.d. and z = {h, c, R, s, p, j, k} . Thus, at time t agents receive a signal about future macroeconomic conditions at time t + n. If the expected movement doesn't occur, then u z,t = −ε z,t−n .
News on Productivity Changes and Boom-Bust Dynamics
This section reports the dynamics of the model in response to news shocks to assess which of them is able to generate boom-bust cycles in the housing market like those seen in the data. We define a boom-bust cycle as a hump-shaped co-movement of real house prices, real consumption, real GDP, real business investment, real housing investment, hours in the consumption and in the housing sector, real wages in the consumption and housing sector, nominal interest rate and inflation.
In the following we consider the case of news about future productivity in the consumption sector and in investment-specific technology. We show that both news generate boom-bust dynamics. Figure 8 reports the effect of anticipated future productivity gains, namely a shock to A c,t (starred line). It also illustrates the case in which the expected increase in productivity turns out to be wrong and at time t = 4 there is no change in productivity (solid line). The dashed line displays the effects of a current unanticipated productivity shock.
Productivity in the Consumption-Good Sector of Production
Expectations of future productivity gains generate boom-bust dynamics in GDP, consumption, hours, investment and house prices. The intuition is as follows. Expectations of higher productivity in the future lead households to increase their current consumption expenditure. Due to demand pressures, inflation increases. At the same time, the anticipation of higher productivity in the future generates expectations of higher future housing prices. The decline in the current real rate coupled with higher expected housing prices lead to an increase in Borrowers' housing expenditure and indebtedness. Due to limits to credit, impatient households increase their labor supply in order to raise internal funds for housing investment.
Given the adjustment costs of capital, firms in the consumption sector start adjusting the stock of capital already at the time in which news about a future increase in productivity spreads. This way, when the increase in productivity occurs, capital is already in place. For the increase in business investment to be coupled with an increase in total hours worked, wages must rise. GDP increases already at the time of the signal.
The model presented above features several real and nominal rigidities. In order to disentangle the contribution of the different modeling choices, we introduce the frictions one at the time. In the additional presence of wage stickiness in the consumption sector, the wage in the consumption sector increases by less (starred line), which raises the demand for labor and therefore hours in the consumption sector. Moreover, since the sectorial wage differential is more pronounced, Savers increase their labor supply in the housing sector as well. Thus, the model displays co-movement of GDP, consumption, business investment and housing prices over the boom-bust cycle. Housing investment and hours in the housing sector, however, fall because wages in the housing sector increase substantially, thereby reducing labor demand in the sector. 11 To obtain a boom in investment and hours in the housing sector it is necessary to introduce wage stickiness in the housing sector.
Finally, we add wage stickiness in both sectors of production (solid line). Since wage stickiness is more sizable in the housing sector, the increase in wage in that sector is less pronounced. Due to a further reduction in the current income effect, agents increase their labor supply by more.
Aggregate housing investment increases more so that housing prices rise less. Household debt increases less but aggregate consumption is barely affected relative to the case of no wage stickiness in the housing sector. 
Investment-specific shock

Monetary Policy and Inflation
In the following we study the role of expectations of future monetary policy developments in driving business cycle fluctuations in the housing market. We document that expectations of a reduction of the policy rate or of a change in the central bank's inflation target generate macroeconomic booms that turn into busts if agents' expectations are not realized ex-post. We also consider the effect of expected future downward pressure in inflation, which also generates boom-bust dynamics.
A current unexpected decline in the interest rate -i.e. a negative realization of R,t -induces Due to capital adjustment costs, firms already begin adjusting the stock of capital when news about a future reduction in the policy rate spreads. For the increase in investment to be coupled with an increase in hours, wages rise in both sectors. The increase in business and housing investment makes GDP increase already at the time of the signal. 13 In the case of an anticipated shock that realizes, aggregate variables boom and then slowly decline. The peak response in output corresponds to the time in which expectations realize. In contrast, if expectations do not realize there is a dramatic drop in both quantities and prices.
Aggregate variables fall below their initial level. It takes about ten quarters for GDP to go back to the initial level. Thus, expectations of looser monetary policy that do not realize generate a macroeconomic boom-bust cycle followed by a recession (solid line).
We also consider the case where agents expect a persistent reduction in the policy rate. For this experiment we set the persistence of the shock u R,t equal to 0.65 in order to capture the situation where agents expect the policy rate to remain low for several periods. The impulse responses are shown in Figure 16 . In this case, the effect on housing prices and on all other aggregate variables is stronger and the initial boom and the subsequent recession are more pronounced relative to the case in where the expected reduction in the policy rate is only for one period. 
Credit Shocks and Boom-Bust Cycles
Boom-bust cycles in asset prices are often associated with a similar behavior in private credit. 14 The results presented above show that the increase in housing prices generated by changes in households' expectations is coupled with an endogenous increase in household indebtedness. An often-heard 14 
See Borio and Lowe (2002).
explanation for the last housing boom is an increase in credit conditions. In the following we analyze the effects of an exogenous change in the access to credit as proxied by shocks to the established loan-to-value ratio -in terms of our model, m.
We first document the effects of a current increase in the loan-to-value ratio. To illustrate the effect of changes in the access to credit, we assume that m follows an AR(1) process with persistence equal to 0.994, as estimated by Iacoviello and Neri (2009) . 15 The dotted line in Figure   19 shows the effect of a one percent temporary increase in the access to credit, namely an increase in m. Borrower's debt and therefore consumption and housing demand increase, which leads to a rise in aggregate consumption, investment and GDP. Demand pressures make housing prices rise; inflation barely rises. However, the model's responses do not display the hump-shaped dynamics that typically emerge in boom-bust cycles. The shock leads to an initial increase in house prices, investment, consumption and GDP and a slow monotone decline towards the initial level.
The starred line in Figure 19 shows the dynamics when agents expect a future increase in credit We also consider the case in which agents expect the current favorable credit conditions to be reversed in the near future. Figure 20 shows the effects of a one-percent current increase in m coupled with expectations of future restrictions in the access to credit, namely with expectations that m will return to its original value after four periods (starred line). For simplicity we analyze only the case in which news materialize. This is compared to a current unanticipated increase in m (dotted line). Relative to the previous case, the impact on most variables is more sizable. Lower expected access to credit in the future induce Borrowers to increase their current demand for loans and housing more relative to the cases analyzed above. As a result, the increase in housing prices and housing investment is more pronounced. Borrowers substitute consumption for housing and supply more labor to take advantage of temporarily better access to credit. In contrast, Savers' consumption and business investment increase due to a rise in the real interest rate. Aggregate 
